Updated: October 19, 2026
Continuing resolutions are Congress’s bridge between the end of one fiscal year and the start of another when regular appropriations are not enacted on time. They keep covered federal agencies funded temporarily, but they do not amount to a completed budget or settle disputes over spending priorities. Their practical effects depend on the text of each law: a CR can preserve prior-year funding, impose special restrictions, provide targeted exceptions, or set a deadline for the next round of negotiations.
As of October 13, 2026, the current fiscal year is FY2027, which began on October 1, 2026, and ends on September 30, 2027. The preceding fiscal year, FY2026, ended on September 30, 2026. Whether agencies are operating under full-year appropriations or a temporary CR is determined by enacted law, not by the president’s budget request or a congressional budget resolution. That distinction matters for federal workers, contractors, state and local governments, and people who depend on federally funded services.
Understanding Continuing Resolutions
A continuing resolution, usually called a CR, is an appropriations law that temporarily provides budget authority for federal activities whose regular appropriations have not been enacted. Congress uses CRs when the new fiscal year begins without a complete set of funding laws, or when existing temporary authority is about to expire. The authority comes from legislation passed by both the House and Senate and signed by the president, or enacted over a veto. A congressional vote or a public announcement alone cannot keep an agency funded.
Many CRs continue funding at a rate tied to the prior fiscal year, but “same as last year” is a shorthand, not a universal rule. The statutory text may specify a rate for particular accounts, make adjustments, prohibit new starts, or exempt named programs. In practice, agencies generally spend under the terms of the CR and applicable appropriations law; they do not receive an unrestricted new annual budget. A CR can also direct that an account be funded at a different rate, so its effects have to be checked account by account.
The duration is another defining feature. A short CR can last days or weeks and create another deadline; a longer one can extend into the fiscal year. If Congress does not pass another law before the CR expires, funding for affected activities lapses. Some agencies or functions may already have full-year appropriations while others remain under temporary authority, meaning a CR deadline does not necessarily apply to every federal program in the same way.
CRs are distinct from shutdowns. A shutdown, in the legal sense, follows a lapse in appropriations for affected activities. Under the Antideficiency Act, agencies generally may not incur obligations exceeding available appropriations, subject to exceptions such as functions needed to protect life or property. During a lapse, some federal employees may be furloughed while employees performing excepted work continue without immediate pay; later back pay is governed by law. A CR avoids that lapse only for the accounts and period it covers.
Historical Context and Trends
CRs became a recurring feature of modern federal budgeting as Congress’s appropriations workload grew and deadlines became harder to meet. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 reshaped the budget process by establishing the congressional budget framework and the House and Senate Budget Committees. It did not eliminate the separate annual appropriations process. Congress still has to enact spending authority for discretionary programs, and delays in completing the 12 regular bills have repeatedly produced temporary funding measures.
The long-run pattern is not simply that CRs became more common in a steady, measurable line. The number and duration of CRs vary by fiscal year, and a single year can include several short extensions before a full-year law is enacted. The Congressional Research Service tracks CR enactments and appropriations history; comparisons should specify whether they count laws, extensions, or fiscal years with at least one CR. Without that definition, claims such as “Congress uses CRs more than half the time” can obscure meaningful differences between a brief bridge and funding that lasts most of a year.
Recent congressional practice illustrates the repeated deadline cycle. For FY2024, Congress enacted a series of temporary measures before completing full-year appropriations in March 2024. The sequence included separate statutory deadlines for groups of agencies, rather than one final funding date for every department. That approach demonstrated how a CR can avert an immediate lapse while leaving lawmakers to negotiate spending levels and policy provisions under time pressure.
The Budget Control Act of 2011, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, and later appropriations agreements also shaped the environment in which CRs are negotiated. Spending caps and agreements can influence the toplines available to appropriators, but they do not themselves fund agencies. Likewise, a congressional budget resolution is an internal framework for Congress; it is not an appropriations law and does not keep federal operations funded. These distinctions help explain why adoption of a budget plan does not necessarily prevent a CR.
Partisan conflict is one cause of delay, but not the only one. Congress must reconcile House and Senate versions, address policy riders, agree on overall spending, and process a large volume of account-level decisions. Leadership choices, floor time, committee capacity, and disagreements within each party can all affect timing. CRs therefore reveal institutional and scheduling problems as well as ideological division.
The Mechanism of Continuing Resolutions
The process begins with the fiscal calendar. The president submits a budget request, generally early in the calendar year, and Congress considers a budget resolution and appropriations legislation. The request is a proposal, not a law. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees divide discretionary funding among 12 subcommittees, which develop bills covering areas such as defense, agriculture, and transportation. Each chamber must pass legislation, and the chambers must agree on identical text before it can go to the president.
If the bills are unfinished as September 30 approaches, lawmakers can pass a CR. The measure may be a standalone bill or part of a larger package. It normally states an expiration date and specifies which appropriations accounts are continued, at what rate, and under what conditions. Provisions may restrict agencies from starting new programs, changing the purpose of funds, or undertaking certain activities without authorization. A CR can also include anomalies—specific exceptions to the general funding rule—when Congress decides that a program cannot sensibly operate at the usual rate.
The House and Senate must pass the same bill, either by approving identical language or by resolving differences through amendments or a conference process. The president then signs it, vetoes it, or takes no action under the constitutional rules governing bills. A short deadline can force a rapid agreement, but it can also push unresolved disputes into the next deadline. If the CR expires without replacement appropriations, affected agencies face a funding lapse.
Full-year appropriations differ from CRs in both duration and detail. They establish budget authority for the fiscal year and can revise account-level amounts, fund new initiatives, or direct agencies to use money in specified ways. A CR usually preserves continuity rather than making a comprehensive set of choices, though its exceptions can still have significant policy effects. It does not automatically raise the statutory debt limit, change mandatory benefit formulas, or enact a complete federal budget.
| Instrument | What it does | Does it fund agencies? |
|---|---|---|
| President’s budget request | Proposes priorities and spending levels to Congress | No; it is a proposal |
| Congressional budget resolution | Sets a congressional framework and may establish budgetary targets | No; it is not an appropriations law |
| Continuing resolution | Temporarily extends specified appropriations authority | Yes, for covered accounts and the period stated |
| Regular appropriations law | Provides full-year discretionary budget authority for covered accounts | Yes, according to its terms |
Impacts on Federal Agencies and Programs
For agencies, a CR changes the timing and certainty of spending decisions. Officials may have authority to continue core operations but still lack a final allocation for the year. The law may limit new projects, expansion, or hiring, and agencies often issue internal guidance telling offices to defer commitments until final appropriations arrive. The effect is not identical across government: a department with a full-year appropriation can plan differently from one whose accounts remain under a short CR.
Contracting and grants are particularly sensitive to uncertainty. A program officer may delay a new grant competition or an agency may postpone a contract award when it cannot confirm the final amount or duration of available funds. A CR does not automatically cancel an existing contract, nor does every delay arise from a CR; the terms of the award, available balances, and agency authority matter. But uncertain funding can make it harder for contractors, universities, nonprofit organizations, and state agencies to plan staffing and cash flow.
Research illustrates the downstream effects. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) funds research through grants that often run across multiple years, but new awards and funding decisions depend on appropriations and agency guidance. A CR can complicate the timing of competitions, award levels, and new initiatives. The National Science Foundation faces similar planning questions. These agencies may continue existing work using available authority, but a delay in final funding can affect when researchers learn whether a proposed project will receive support.
Education provides another concrete example. The Department of Education administers federal programs including Title I grants to local educational agencies and funds under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Those programs have statutory rules and funding schedules, so it is too broad to say that a CR simply stops school funding. The practical uncertainty is often about the amount, timing, or availability of new discretionary commitments, while existing legal obligations and previously available balances may continue to matter.
National security and infrastructure programs can also face complications. The Department of Homeland Security includes agencies with continuing operational responsibilities, while new technology purchases and planned expansions may depend on account-specific authority. The Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration must manage programs and projects against enacted funding and other legal authorities. A CR’s precise restrictions determine what can proceed; generalizations that every security upgrade or infrastructure project stops are not reliable without examining the relevant account and statutory language.
The operational cost can accumulate even when there is no shutdown. Repeated short-term deadlines consume time as managers prepare for possible lapses, revise spending plans, and communicate with vendors and grant recipients. Federal agencies can use apportionments and internal controls to manage funds, but those tools do not substitute for Congress’s final appropriation. A later full-year law may provide more certainty, yet it cannot always recover a missed construction season, delayed recruitment, or lost planning time.
Challenges and Criticisms of Continuing Resolutions
The central criticism is that a CR preserves continuity without necessarily matching current needs. A prior-year rate can be too low for an account facing increased costs or new responsibilities, while another program may not need the same level. Inflation can also reduce what a nominally unchanged amount buys. A CR can address selected pressures through anomalies, but negotiating exceptions account by account is not the same as completing a full appropriations bill.
CRs also constrain the ability to launch new initiatives. Restrictions on “new starts” and related provisions can prevent agencies from beginning projects that were not funded in the prior year. Even where the law does not impose a categorical ban, managers may hesitate to enter multiyear commitments before they know the final appropriation. The result can be a gap between a policy Congress has endorsed and the actual funding needed to implement it.
Repeated extensions create administrative costs and uncertainty for the workforce and organizations that rely on federal decisions. Agencies may delay hiring or awards, while contractors and grantees must plan around deadlines that can shift. Short deadlines can also lead to compressed negotiations, making it harder for lawmakers and the public to scrutinize account-level choices. Those pressures are real even when the government remains open and payroll continues.
There are counterarguments. A CR can be preferable to a shutdown, and it can buy time for negotiators to settle difficult disputes rather than forcing an arbitrary full-year agreement. It may also prevent abrupt changes in programs that Congress has not yet debated. Its value as a bridge, however, depends on lawmakers using the additional time to reach an agreement; a succession of bridges can simply reproduce the same uncertainty.
Claims about waste or damage should be tied to evidence and a specific program. A CR does not necessarily reduce every agency’s total funding, and its effects vary according to its duration, account coverage, and exceptions. The strongest assessment asks which account was affected, what the CR prohibited or continued, how long the uncertainty lasted, and what measurable decision was delayed. That approach is more informative than treating all CRs as identical.
The Political Landscape of Continuing Resolutions
A CR is both a funding measure and a negotiating deadline. Party leaders may use it to keep the government operating while bargaining over the overall spending level, policy riders, or the terms of a larger package. Because a CR must clear both chambers and receive presidential approval, its passage can require agreement among lawmakers with different priorities, even when the same parties control both chambers.
Negotiations often involve a choice between a clean extension and a package with additional provisions. A “clean” CR generally extends funding without major policy changes, but no short label replaces reading the bill: even a measure described as clean can contain technical adjustments or targeted exceptions. Riders concerning immigration, abortion, environmental rules, or other policy disputes can make a funding bill harder to pass because they broaden the negotiation beyond spending levels.
Recent precedent shows how deadlines can be staged. The FY2024 funding process used multiple temporary measures and separate dates for different groups of agencies before Congress enacted full-year appropriations in March 2024. This structure avoided one immediate government-wide lapse, but it also meant lawmakers faced recurring deadlines and agencies had different funding timelines. It is a useful example of why the number of CRs alone does not capture the pressure created by the process.
Political leverage is not limited to party leaders. Members may seek particular policy language or spending protections, while the president can signal whether a measure is acceptable. House and Senate procedural rules also shape what can reach the floor and how amendments are considered. In the House, a majority must be assembled under the applicable rules; in the Senate, debate and cloture procedures can affect the time required to pass legislation. A CR can therefore expose internal party divisions as much as disagreements between parties.
Public attention tends to intensify as a deadline approaches, especially when agencies issue shutdown guidance or federal workers face uncertainty. Yet brinkmanship has costs: even if Congress reaches a deal, agencies may have little time to plan before the next deadline. The political test is not only whether lawmakers avoid a lapse, but whether the temporary measure leads to a durable funding agreement rather than another short extension.
Future of Continuing Resolutions in Budgeting
CRs are likely to remain available because they solve a specific legal and operational problem: they can extend appropriations authority when regular bills are not ready. Reducing their use depends on Congress completing more of the appropriations process earlier, not merely on changing the label attached to a temporary measure. The 12-bill workload, chamber disagreements, and competition for floor time will remain relevant regardless of procedural reform.
One proposed reform is an automatic CR that takes effect when Congress misses a deadline. Advocates argue that automatic funding could reduce the threat of shutdowns. The design is decisive: an automatic extension could use prior-year rates, adjust for inflation, impose limits on new programs, or apply different rules to defense and nondefense accounts. Each choice would shift bargaining power and could encourage delay if lawmakers know funding will continue automatically. It would prevent some lapses, but it would not itself resolve disputes over priorities or provide tailored full-year allocations.
Congress could also change its own procedures, including committee schedules, reporting deadlines, or floor time for appropriations bills. Such changes may help, but deadlines without enforcement can be insufficient. Reforms would need to account for the Senate’s legislative procedures, the House’s rules, presidential action, and the fact that budget negotiations can be disrupted by elections, emergencies, or major policy disagreements.
Technology can support the process without replacing political decisions. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) publishes cost estimates and budget analyses; the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviews federal management and spending; and agency financial systems track obligations and balances. Better use of standardized data, clear public bill text, and timely account-level reporting could help legislators and the public understand what a proposed CR changes. Artificial intelligence or forecasting tools cannot decide which programs should receive funding, and their projections require transparent assumptions and human review.
A more practical measure of reform would track outcomes: how many regular appropriations bills clear each chamber before October 1, how often Congress relies on extensions, the average length of temporary funding, and which agencies remain under a CR. Those measures should distinguish enacted full-year funding from temporary authority and account for bills that combine multiple appropriations. Transparent definitions would make comparisons more useful than broad claims about a rising trend.
Conclusion: Balancing Needs and Challenges
Continuing resolutions are a necessary instrument of congressional budgeting, but they are not a substitute for annual appropriations. For FY2027, the relevant calendar runs from October 1, 2026, through September 30, 2027; the funding status of each agency depends on the laws Congress has enacted for that period. A CR can maintain operations for covered accounts, while a lapse in authority can trigger shutdown procedures under the Antideficiency Act.
The effects are specific, not uniform. A short extension with carefully written exceptions may provide a workable bridge; repeated short deadlines can delay awards, hiring, procurement, and planning. The difference is visible in the statutory text: the covered accounts, funding rate, restrictions, anomalies, and expiration date determine what agencies can do. Those details matter more than the label “stopgap.”
Congress can reduce uncertainty by completing the 12 regular appropriations bills on time, making deadlines meaningful, and explaining clearly what temporary measures permit or restrict. When a CR is unavoidable, lawmakers should identify the programs that need exceptions and give agencies enough time to administer the resulting law. The goal is not to eliminate flexibility, but to make temporary funding an occasional bridge rather than a routine replacement for full-year decisions.
Sources: House Appropriations Committee · Congress.gov legislative glossary